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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

obligation which imposes a duty of care, loyalty, good faith, and full
disclosure clearly attaches to the partnership relationship.2 ' The latter
duty requires full and frank disclosure of all matters affecting the partnership entity, 5 and it presumably was satisfied in this case because
Heller discovered financial difficulties in April and notified his copartners of that fact in May.26 In addition, Heller was entitled to do business
with the firm and the trial court found no evidence indicating a breach
of trust, fraud, or misconduct.? Consequently, Heller apparently did act
in good faith and at arm's length and therefore could properly bring the
bankruptcy action without breaching his duties to the partnership or his
fellow shareholder-partners.
Domestic Relations-ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-Gorder v. Sims,
Minn. -,
237 N.W.2d 67 (1975).
Some call it legalized "blackmail";' others find it to be an anachronism in contemporary society;2 still others believe it prevents intrusion
into the "special relationship which exists between a husband and
wife." 3 This last view describes the recent posture of the Minnesota
Supreme Court in affirming a $20,000 jury award for the tort of alienation of affections in Gorder v. Sims.' The court, by its dual acts of
affirming a substantial jury award of damages and possibly lessening
the proof required to establish the tort, has ripened this cause of action
for renewed legislative attack.
In Gorder, a husband sued for the loss of his wife's affections which
N.W.2d 708, 712 (1949) (partnership fiduciary duties), the Hellercourt could have reached
the conclusion that the defendant did not breach his fiduciary duty without piercing the
corporate veil.
24. See Lipinski v. Lipinski, 227 Minn. 511, 518, 35 N.W.2d 708, 712 (1949); Bloom v.
Lofgren, 64 Minn. 1, 2, 65 N.W. 960, 961 (1896). See generally Note, FiduciaryDuties of
Partners, 48 IOWA L. REv. 902 (1963).
25. See, e.g., Crawford v. Lugoff, 175 Minn. 226, 228, 220 N.W. 822, 823 (1928). MINN.
STAT. § 323.19 (1976) requires full disclosure "on demand." However, because the law of
agency supplements the U.P.A., MINN. STAT. § 323.04 (1976), the disclosure requirement
is not restricted to demand. Accord, Alexander v. Sims, 220 Ark. 643, 651, 249 S.W.2d
832, 836 (1952) (each partner has right to know all that others know and each is required
to make full disclosure of all material facts within his knowledge).
26.

-

Minn. at

-,

235 N.W.2d at 826.

27. Id.
1. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 68, § 34 (Smith-Hurd 1959) ("action for alienation of
affections has been subjected to grave abuses and has been used as an instrument for
blackmail by unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment").
2. See, e.g., Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 176-78, 115 So. 447, 450 (1928) (court
refused to recognize alienation of affections as a cause of action); Wyman v. Wallace, 15
Wash. App. 395, 549 P.2d 71 (1976) (per curiam) (judicial abolition of the tort).
3. See Gorder v. Sims, Minn. , 4.
- Minn. , 237 N.W.2d 67 (1975).
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allegedly began during his convalescence from an operation. The defendant, a family friend, periodically met with the plaintiff's wife
during this time for meals and for what the defendant termed "companionship." A subsequent confrontation between the parties about
three years later led to the defendant's declaration that he would
"win" the plaintiff's wife away from the plaintiff. This evidence prevailed over other evidence showing the plaintiff's own misconduct in the
marriage and, in the view of the court, was sufficient to sustain the jury
verdict that the defendant had alienated the affections of the plaintiffs
wife.
In its review of the evidence, the court avoided discussion of what
previously has been a key element of the tort-controlling cause. ' In an
alienation of affections suit, the Minnesota court has long required proof
that the defendant's acts were the controlling cause of the tort in addition to showing four other elements: the existence of affections between
the spouses, the loss of those affections, defendant's active part in causing the loss, and the willfullness and intentional nature of defendant's
acts.' Controlling cause has also been called by the court the moving
cause,7 the inducing8 or procuring cause,' but more than a substantial
factor or proximate cause's in the loss of affections. In short, enticement
has been the gravamen of this intentional tort."
Although the Gordercourt found that the plaintiff had established the
four elements of the tort, it was silent regarding the element of controlling cause. The failure to discuss this traditional element of the tort
cannot be viewed with any certainty as a judicial rejection of the element. 2 However, if proof of controlling cause is in fact no longer necessary to the establishment of the tort, defendants will find it more difficult to defend successfully 3 by showing circumstances, other than their
5. See, e.g., Pedersen v. Jirsa, 267 Minn. 48, 52, 125 N.W.2d 38, 42 (1963); Johnson v.
Lindquist, 177 Minn. 270, 271, 224 N.W. 839, 839 (1929); Kleber v. Allin, 153 Minn. 433,
434, 190 N.W. 786, 787 (1922).
6. See, e.g., Pedersen v. Jirsa, 267 Minn. 48, 52, 125 N.W.2d 38, 41-42 (1963).
7. See Spangenberg v. Christian, 151 Minn. 356, 359, 186 N.W. 700, 701 (1922).
8. See Bathke v. Krassin, 78 Minn. 272, 274-75, 80 N.W. 950, 951-52 (1899). In reversing
an award of damages against a defendant for lack of evidence, the court distinguishes
generally between indirect and direct inducement. The implication is that only direct
inducement would be actionable.
9. See Gjesdahl v. Harmon, 175 Minn. 414, 419, 221 N.W. 639, 640 (1928).
10. See Pedersen v. Jirsa, 267 Minn. 48, 54-55, 125 N.W.2d 38, 43 (1963).
11. See id. See also Lockwood v. Lockwood, 67 Minn. 476, 490, 70 N.W. 784, 789 (1897).
12. On appeal, the defendant stated that the plaintiff "would have the Minnesota court
disregard the requirements of enticement and controlling cause which are essential under
Minnesota law." Appellant's Reply Brief at 3 (emphasis in original).
13. Even prior to Gorder, the court observed that alienation of affections suits were
"notoriously difficult to defend against," especially when the husband-wife privilege was
invoked. See Pedersen v. Jirsa, 267 Minn. 48, 53, 125 N.W.2d 38, 42 (1963). MINN. STAT.
§ 595.02(1) (1976) sets forth the statutory husband-wife privilege. The exceptions to the
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own conduct, which may have caused the loss in no lesser degree." Thus,
this possible increased potential for success, when combined with the
court's allowance of generous punitive damages, would add teeth to a
relatively dormant cause of action.
After holding that the evidence supported a jury finding that the tort
had been committed, the court addressed the issue of damages. The
majority in Gorder considered the damage award of $20,000 reasonable,
relying on evidence of the wife's voluntary contribution of $10,000 toward the purchase of the family residence two years before the tortious
conduct occurred. However, the court conceded the difficulty of ascertaining damages in cases of this kind. 5 The subjectivity of measuring
damages and the inflammatory nature of the tort combined to invite an
attack on the award by two dissenting justices. In his dissent, Justice
Otis argued that because damages awarded for this tort are in truth
punitive, the award should not exceed "an amount which is commensurate with the gravity of the defendant's intrusion into plaintiff's marital
relation." This position is consistent with previous reductions of jury
awards in "heart balm" cases on the ground that the jury was influenced
by passion and prejudice. 7 The nature of the action increases the likeliprivilege include situations where the spouses are opposing parties in civil litigation, which
is not the case in an alienation of affections suit.
14. Evidence of plaintiffs conduct toward his spouse and the spouse's feelings toward
the plaintiff are admissible to show that the defendant was not the cause of the loss of
affections. See, e.g., Spangenberg v. Christian, 151 Minn. 356, 358, 186 N.W. 700, 700-01
(1922). However, Spangenberg did not consider it error to fail to instruct the jury that
plaintiff's misconduct mitigates damages. Id. at 359-60, 186 N.W. at 701.
In Pedersen v. Jirsa, 267 Minn. 48, 54-55, 125 N.W.2d 38, 43 (1963), the court implied
that kindliness, attractiveness, desirability, financial superiority, and merely being a good
friend did not of themselves provide actionable conduct. The acts complained of must be
"calculated to entice the affections of one spouse away from the other." Id. at 55, 125
N.W.2d at 43.
15. Gorder v. Sims, - Minn ....
237 N.W.2d 67, 71 (1975).
16. See id. at -,
237 N.W.2d at 73 (Otis, J., dissenting). Justice Otis wrote that
"plaintiff's own misconduct played a substantial role in alienating his wife's affections."
Id. In Kleber v. Allin, 153 Minn. 433, 436, 190 N.W. 786, 787 (1922), the court listed the
factors to be considered in determining the amount of damages: the existing state of
affections, the attending circumstances, the motive of the intervening party, and the
wantonness of the intervener's acts. Although he does not so state, Justice Otis's proposed
reduction may have been influenced by balancing these factors. The majority of the court
avoided a judicial balancing by adhering to the principle, enunciated in Spangenberg v.
Christian, 151 Minn. 356, 359, 186 N.W. 700, 701 (1922), that the award of damages should
"rest largely in the sound common sense of the jury," and should not be disturbed on
appeal. It may be argued that the Spangenberg court's reliance on the jury's common
sense was re-examined by the Kleber court and was found to be an unsatisfactory principle. While both cases were decided the same year, Kleber was the later of the two opinions.
In any case, the issue, as the Gordercourt indicates, was not strenuously argued by counsel
on appeal. See Minn. -,
-,
237 N.W.2d 67, 71 (1975).
17. Compare Bathke v. Krassin, 78 Minn. 272, 274, 80 N.W. 950, 952 (1899) with
Spangenberg v. Christian, 151 Minn. 356, 359, 186 N.W. 700, 701 (1922) (court specifically
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hood that passion and prejudice will affect the jury's subjective findings.
In the "interests of justice,"'" the two dissenting justices would have
reduced the jury award from $20,000 to $5,000, observing that this tort,
not a favorite of the law, has been abolished in other jurisdictions."9
Abolition of the tort was then considered but rejected by the majority"o of the Gorder court. The defendant argued that the tort was contrary to public policy in light of increased sexual freedom accepted by
the married as well as the unmarried. Conceding this fact, the court
relied on the trial court's instruction to the jury that the parties' behavior be judged by contemporary social standards.
The Gorder court referred advocates of abolition to the legislature for
relief.2' In fourteen states, "anti-heart balm" statutes have been enacted
abolishing the torts of alienation of affections, breach of promise, criminal conversation, and seduction." These statutes have been upheld
found no passion or prejudice). The excessive damage award was the major issue in Bathke
v. Krassin, 82 Minn. 226, 84 N.W. 796 (1901) and Bathke v. Krassin, 78 Minn. 272, 80
N.W. 950 (1899). The first appeal followed two trials, the first trial resulting in a new trial
on the issue of excessive damages. On appeal from the second trial, the court remanded
for a third trial, finding damages excessive. After this trial, defendants appealed again
from an excessive award of damages and the court on review agreed. The court said that
unless plaintiff agreed to a reduction of damages to $1500, a new trial would be ordered.
82 Minn. 226, 229, 84 N.W. 796, 797 (1901).
18. See Gorder v. Sims, - Minn ....
237 N.W.2d 67, 73 (1975).
19. Id. at
-, 237 N.W.2d at 72.
20. See id. at -,
237 N.W.2d at 71.
21. See id. The Gorder court chose not to abolish the tort judicially. However, both
Louisiana and Washington courts have done so, relying heavily on state law which does
not allow the recovery of punitive damages in civil suits. See Moulin v. Monteleone, 165
La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1928); Wyman v. Wallace, 15 Wash. App. 395, 549 P.2d 71 (1976)
(per curiam).
22. See ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 115 (1958) (no causes of action for alienation of affections,
criminal conversation, or seduction of females age 21 or older); CAL. CiV. CODE § 43.5 (West
1954) (abolishes all four causes of action); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-202 (1973)
(abolishes all four causes of action); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572b (West Supp. 1976)
(abolishes alienation of affections and breach of promise to marry); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
771.01 (West 1964) (abolishes all four causes of action); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 34-40
(Smith-Hurd 1959) (actual damages only recoverable in alienation of affections suit); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-4-4-1 (Burns Supp. 1976) (abolishes all four causes of action); MD. CTS.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-301 (1974) (abolishes alienation of affections and breach of
promise); MicH. CoMP. LAws § 600-2901 (1968) (abolishes all four causes of action); NEv.
REv. STAT. § 41.380 (1973) (abolishes breach of promise and alienation of affections); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (West 1952) (abolishes all four causes of action); N.Y. Civ. RiGHTs
LAw § 80-a (McKinney 1976) (abolishes all four causes of action); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48,
§§ 170-171 (Purdon 1965) (abolishes breach of promise and alienation of affections); Wyo.
STAT. § 1-728 (1959) (abolishes all four causes of action). See generally H. CLARK, THE LAW
OF DoMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 10.2, at 267-68 (1968) (reasons for adoption
of such statutes); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 887-88 (4th ed.
1971) (questioning desirability of such statutes and discussing the courts' construction of
them).
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against constitutional challenge.2 In Illinois, however, a successful challenge was based on the state constitutional provision which guarantees
a legal remedy for every injury suffered." The Minnesota Constitution
contains a similar clause.n Relying on that clause, one of the earliest
Minnesota alienation of affections cases extended the remedy to a
woman. 6 Abrogation of the remedy may conflict with the constitutional
guarantee unless both a reasonable substitute and a permissible objective are found. The objective might be simply to prevent vexatious
litigation, 28 which is not unforeseeable if alienation of affections has
been made more attractive to the litigant. However, discovery of a reasonable substitute for the tort requires greater imagination.
The Minnesota Legislature has failed on at least two occasions to pass
bills which would have abolished the tort.2 Possibly the belief prevails
that abolition of alienation of affections might "reverse abruptly the
entire tendency of the law to give increased protection to family interests and the sanctity of the home. ' 30 Although it is unlikely that the
threat of substantial jury awards will strengthen the family interest, the
Gorder award may provide a basis for legislative reconsideration of abolition of the tort.
23. See, e.g., Bunten v. Bunten, 15 N.J. Misc. 532, 192 A. 727 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Hanfgarn v. Mark, 274 N.Y. 22, 8 N.E.2d 47 (1937) (sustained statutory abolition of alienation
of affections); Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 5 N.E.2d 815 (1936) (sustained statutory
abolition of breach of promise).
24. See Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946). The amended Illinois
statute, ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 68, §§ 34-40 (Smith-Hurd 1959), permits recovery of actual
damages only and does not permit the financial status of the defendant, the plaintiffs
mental anguish or reputation, and other elements to be considered in the award of damages. The amended statute as it relates to breach of promise was found constitutional in
Smith v. Hill, 12 Ill.2d 588, 147 N.E.2d 327 (1958). What the amended statute does, in
effect, is to make possible recovery so minimal as to discourage all but truly injured parties
from bringing suit.
25. Compare MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8 with ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
26. See Lockwood v. Lockwood, 67 Minn. 476, 481-82, 70 N.W. 784, 785 (1897).
27. Cf Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615 (1974) (third party's right
of indemnity unconstitutionally extinguished by workers' compensation laws because no
reasonable substitute and no legitimate legislative objective). But see Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375, 384-85, 201 N.W.2d 140, 145-46 (1972) (dictum). The
Haney court cites Hanfgarn v. Mark, 274 N.Y. 22, 8 N.E.2d 47 (1937), observing that the
New York statute which abolished the tort of alienation of affections was found constitutional because it furthered a "legitimate legislative objective in correcting an evil growing
out of the marriage relationship." 294 Minn. at 385, 201 N.W.2d at 146. The Haney court
implies that common-law rights may be abrogated without a reasonable substitute if a
legitimate legislative objective is fostered. See id. at 384-85, 201 N.W.2d at 145-46. See
also Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., 40 Minn. 117, 122-23, 41 N.W. 936, 938 (1889).
28. See, e.g., Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375, 385, 201 N.W.2d
140, 146 (1972).
29. Bills were introduced in 1977, H.F. 302, 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977), and in
1974, S. 2947, 68th Minn. Legis., 2d Sess. (1974).
30. See W. PROSSER, supra note 22, at 887.
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